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Introduction 
The recent health service reforms announced in the White Paper suggest an extended role in 
the NHS for foundation trusts (FTs) in future (Department of Health 2010).  In particular: 
 All trusts will become FTs within 3 years.  
 A range of governance arrangement will be possible from employee-led only to wider 
public and patient membership. 
 A range of increased freedoms will be consulted on, including abolishing the cap on 
earnings from sources other than NHS patients, facilitating mergers and the tailoring 
of governance arrangements to local needs. 
 Monitor will be the economic regulator for all trusts whilst quality monitoring will be 
within the remit of the Care Quality Commission. 
This report summarises briefly the evidence (as at February 2010) on FTs across a number of 
domains of relevance to the reforms. 
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Summary 
 
There is limited research evidence on foundation trusts (FTs) and much of the available material is in 
the form of commentary or the regular reports from Monitor.  Comparative research is made difficult 
through lack of a counter-factual and robust methods are required to overcome bias. Summary points 
from the literature and from some initial analysis of Monitor reports that we have undertaken for this 
review are given below.  Future policy and research issues are highlighted in the main report. 
 
Corporate governance/accountability 
 
 It is difficult to identify directly the degree to which the aims of µsocial ownership¶ as expressed 
by the government at the launch of FTs have been achieved. 
 There is emerging evidence to suggest that more experienced governors are more actively 
engaged with FT business but there are still challenges to be tackled, such as the degree to 
which engagement is in strategic rather than routine issues, and the ability of elected 
governors to feel they can represent constituency interests. 
 The notion that FTs are more democratic in nature and are more accountable to local people 
has not really been supported by the research evidence. 
 
Finance 
 
 FTs have been successful in generating and accumulating financial surpluses, a process 
which appears to have been aided by FT status creating an incentive for improved financial 
practices. However, accumulation has been uneven across FTs.  
 FTs are not using credit facilities to the anticipated extent, primarily due to a lack of larger-
scale investment though credit availability may be becoming an issue. Instead limited 
investment has been mostly funded from existing surpluses.  This has led to stockpiled and 
unused surplus held by FTs. 
 )7V¶DELOLW\WRFUHDWHVXUSOXVHVPD\EHXQGHUWKUHDWDVa result of the recession. 
 
Quality 
 
 FTs generally score more highly in quality dimensions than non-FTs.  However, given the 
weaker emphasis by Monitor on quality to date and the lack of strong incentives (as opposed 
to those for financial matters), this is likely to be more a function of the self-selection of the 
best-performing trusts to FT status, rather than a function of FT status itself.   
 There have been a number of high-profile quality failures, some of which occurred some time 
after FT status had been achieved.  The average quality rating has improved over time but 
WKHUHKDYHEHHQDQXPEHURIWUXVWVZKLFKV\VWHPDWLFDOO\UHSRUWµUHG¶ULVNUDWLQJV 
 
 
Regulation 
 
 A major issue is the clarity and cost-effectiveness of the regulatory regime.   
 The regulatory landscape will need to be clarified when all trusts become FTs as having 
separate regulators may be expensive and give rise to a lack of coherence.  
 There is some evidence to suggest that the lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities has 
played a part in the failure to address serious performance issues in a timely fashion. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this review is to provide to the Department of Health an overview of the evidence related to  
foundation trusts (FTs).  It draws on the available research evidence and also on commentary from 
organisations and individuals.  In addition, it provides a brief analysis of FT performance as a means 
of supplementing the sparse research literature.  Four areas are considered below ± corporate 
governance and accountability; finance; quality; and regulation. We conclude with some observations 
on future policy and research issues. 
 
 
2. Corporate governance/accountability 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
FTs are µpublic benefit organisations¶ in which NHS staff and local citizens share in the governance of 
the organisation through their membership rights.  Governors are elected by the members or are 
appointed by the PCT, Local Authorities and other partner organisations, and form the Board of 
Governors.  Governors elected by public members must be in the majority on the Board which is 
recognised within the constitution of the trust.  
 
Different types of role with various degrees of influence have been identified for the Board of 
*RYHUQRUV EXW WKH WKUXVW RI WKH )7 SROLF\ ZDV WR ³«KHUald a new form of social ownership where 
health services are owned by and accountable to local people rather than Central Government.  In 
this way, much stronger connections will be established between providers of NHS services and their 
stakeholder communLWLHV«´'R+ 
 
As Allen (2006) notes, this aspect of FT policy was part of a broader decentralisation strategy in the 
public services aimed at tipping the balance away from the centre to allow greater autonomy whilst 
ensuring accountability at the local level.  The issue of clinical governance and quality assurance is 
covered in sections four and five. 
 
2.2 Evidence 
 
Most research has aimed to (a) describe the operation of the governance arrangements in FTs in 
order to assess whether it accords with the initial policy aims, for instance by looking at the 
composition of membership in terms of local representation; and (b) assess the role of the governors 
in terms of their influence on health services, relationship with directors and the impact on 
accountability of the FT.  The latter is clearly more difficult to assess and the evidence tends to be 
based on a small number of case studies and mainly on qualitative evidence gleaned from interviews 
or on survey data.   
 
There was wide variation in the strategy followed by FTs to recruit members from the local community 
and most studies of original FTs suggest only modest success overall in terms of achieving large 
scale membership or a membership representative of local communities (Day and Klein 2005; 
Healthcare Commission 2005) with younger people and those from ethnic minorities under-
represented.  More recent research appears to be more positive with signs of increasing public 
membership and representation (Lewis and Hinton 2008; Lusk 2007).  Moreover, some FTs are 
taking steps to profile their membership and to target specifically under-represented groups (eg the 
µYoung Supporters¶ programme in S Essex) (Ham and Hunt 2008). 
 
The degree to which membership reflects µactive citizenship¶ rather than just appearing as members 
on paper, has been investigated through the voting behaviour of members in terms of turnout for 
election of Governors.  The evidence on this is mixed as turnout appears highly variable.  In early 
case studies, some very poor turnouts (on very small membership numbers) were reported± for 
instance Day and Klein (2005) noted that three governors in one FT were voted for by only 89 people 
from the local residents constituency. In contrast the Healthcare Commission (2005) found turnout 
rates of up to 70% amongst patient groups.  Ham and Hunt (2008) looked at overall turnout in the six 
FTs in their study, which varied between 15% and 45% in 2007.  There was no indication of a general 
improvement over time since 2004, and indeed, rates appeared to have declined in the established 
FTs. They also reported instances of governors standing unopposed or a lack of candidates and 
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resulting vacancies in some instances.  However, in the established FTs, involvement by members 
was apparent, such as participating in seminars or open days. Many of these activities appear to be 
µinformation giving¶ from the FT to members in the form of letters and briefings, rather than µactive¶ 
participation. 
 
These potential shortcomings in terms of the breadth of membership and representation are in part 
likely to be a reason why research suggests that governors often find their relationship with the local 
constituents challenging.   Whilst it is clear that governors believe they should be representing their 
local community and trust members, they do not always feel able to do so: whilst 90% of survey 
respondents agreed with their representation role, considerably fewer felt confident they are able to 
fulfil it (iPSOS MORI 2008).  Only 8% of respondents selected µeffective representation of the 
community and trust members¶ as one of their achievements so far.   Whilst there are some examples 
of FTs where governors hold constituency meetings successfully (Ham and Hunt 2008), the 
relationship does seem to be a difficult one at present.   
 
Evidence on the relationship between governors and the board of directors and about the impact on 
services and work of the FT is more difficult to interpret.  Again, early case studies seemed to suggest 
a lack of clarity about the role of Governors amongst the governors themselves, although FT directors 
appeared clearer.  For instance, a study of a single FT over the first year of operation (Lewis and 
Hinton 2008) suggested there was confusion and lack of clarity amongst governors and directors 
about the different facets of the role of governor (e.g. advisory, guardianship and strategic) and that 
the governors made µlittle tangible impact¶ on the running of the hospital and that the idea of 
influencing the management of the trust had not been achieved.   The role of governor fell into that of 
µconsultation¶ and there was no discernable impact on strategy.  The public governors who were 
elected locally felt very circumscribed in their role once elected.  It was the first year of operation of 
the trusts so perhaps transformation was too high an expectation. 
 
Taking a longer perspective, Ham and Hunt (2008), reporting on their study at six FTs at the end of 
2007, suggested that, while such problems were common in early days of FTs, there were signs that 
³WKHUe is increasing clarity on the role of the board of governors and how the knowledge and skills of 
JRYHUQRUVFDQEHXVHG WREHVWDGYDQWDJH´ 7KH\ IRXQG WKDWDQXPEHURIJRYHUQRUVZHUH LQYROYHG
with the work on FTs in an active way although stakeholder governors were not as engaged. 
 
A postal survey of FT governors (in all of the 73 FTs in existence at the time) undertaken on behalf of 
Monitor in 2007 also yielded more positive findings (iPSOS MORI 2008).  In particular, 79% of 
governors agreed that they were clear about their role and responsibilities, although this was lower 
amongst more recent governors and the responses (response rate was 55%) were likely to come 
from those who were more actively engaged.  Many were involved in sub-committees relating to trust 
business and this was an indicator of engagement. Most of these committees related to membership 
strategy, recruitment of chairs and non-executive directors and remuneration and only 12% reported 
being involved in sub-committees relating to strategy and only 15% said they would feel confident 
explaining strategy to a new governor.   Attendance of governors at meetings of board of directors 
and at meetings between themselves appears highly variable (Ham and Hunt 2008, iPSOS MORI 
2008).  
 
In terms of impact, it is of course very difficult to attribute specific changes in services or strategy to 
the governance structure of FTs.  FTs appear positive about their governance arrangements and 
suggest that there is greater consultation with members about services (Audit Commission 2008) and 
there are examples of good outcomes where governors have been directly involved with aspects of 
VWUDWHJ\GHYHORSPHQW+DPDQG+XQW+RZHYHULQUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHJRYHUQRUV¶VXUYH\
did not answer the question asking them to state the achievements they had made in their role so far 
(iPSOS MORI 2008).  Whilst 13% said it was too early in their role to say, there was still a high 
proportion not able to specify any impact at all even when suggestions listed included relatively minor 
things such as becoming µbetter informed¶.  When asked about how their achievements had benefitted 
others in the trust, patients or the community, the top ten answers had very low responses: the top 
was 7% for improved communications; only 3% said it had given patients a voice; and 40% did not 
answer at all.   
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0RQLWRU¶V FRUSRUDWH VWUDWHJ\ IRU -12 includes several actions aimed at helping governors to 
understand their role and enhancing the way in which FTs engage with their membership (Monitor 
2009f).  
 
2.3 Conclusions 
 
It is difficult to identify directly the degree to which the aims of µsocial ownership¶ as expressed by the 
government at the launch of FTs have been achieved. 
 
Research on the process of governance and the make-up of membership has been ambiguous but 
much of it focuses on early stages of the FT experience. There is emerging evidence to suggest that 
more experienced governors are more actively engaged with FT business but there are still 
challenges to be tackled, such as the degree to which engagement is in strategic rather than routine 
issues, and the ability of elected governors to feel they can represent constituency interests. The 
notion that FTs are more democratic in nature and are more accountable to local people has not 
really been supported by the research evidence.  However, some FTs appear to be taking seriously 
the challenge of involving local communities in local health issues. The resource implications of such 
efforts and the degree to which they overlap or replace other channels for public involvement are not 
well documented. 
 
Whilst it is possible to document the process of governance in terms of the nature of structures, 
potential for accountability and the opportunities for elected governors to attend meetings and 
influence directors of the FT, perhaps the most important issue is the degree to which the reduction in 
central accountability has been replaced by an effective means of local accountability.  The running 
costs of the governance process were estimated at µcirca  SHU WUXVW¶ OHDGLQJ WR HVWLPDWHG
annual costs of over £25 million (House of Commons Health Committee 2008).  It is important that 
evidence of an impact on the FT, local community and ultimately services is forthcoming. 
 
The recent high-profile failings in clinical quality within a number of FTs suggest that gaps in the 
process of monitoring quality may exist.  This is discussed in section four. 
 
 
3. Finance 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The freedom of FTs to have greater autonomy in managing their own financial affairs and the ability to 
keep and ultimately invest, or borrow on the strength of, yearly surpluses is one of the key purposes 
underpinning the creation of FTs.   
 
As good previous financial management was a qualifying condition for trusts to become FTs, simple 
comparisons of FTs against non-FT trusts may not be valid despite the common assertion that FTs 
are µout-performing¶ non FTs financially.  The only research that attempts to adjust for selection bias 
has concluded that there seem to be longstanding differential trends between these different groups 
of trusts and the FT policy per se has not made a significant difference to their financial management 
(Marini et al 2007).  However, the research was based only on the early experience of FTs. 
 
As all trusts will eventually become FTs, then the question of the difference the FT status makes to a 
trust relative to non-FT status may be of less policy interest than the financial performance of FTs 
over time.  This is considered in the next section in terms of performance against the objectives set 
out for FTs: are FTs making surpluses and are they investing them in staff or capital projects which 
will benefit the population served? 
 
3.2 Evidence 
 
FTs are expected to generate surpluses that may be carried forward. To a large extent, this 
expectation has been fulfilled: In the first three years that FTs were operational, their cash surplus 
increased to £1.5 billion by the end of the first six months of 2007/08. This represented about 38 days 
of operating expenses (Audit Commission 2008).   And the latest Monitor quarterly report states that 
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this stock of cash surplus has risen to £2.5 billion (Monitor 2009d).  In conclusion, surpluses are 
clearly being generated and carried forward, though it should be noted that these surpluses are not 
evenly distributed across FTs. 
 
The extent to which these surpluses are a function of FT status is debatable. However it has been 
acknowledged that the ability of an FT to keep surpluses has provided some degree of motivation in 
producing surpluses (House of Commons Health Committee Report 2008).  
 
Despite the historical growth of surpluses, the current and future economic climate may provide more 
testing conditions. This is most easily observed via the quarterly and annual Financial Risk Ratings 
(FRR) produced by Monitor.  FRRs are forward looking assessments presented as a scorecard, 
where a rating of 5 reflects the lowest level of financial risk and a rating of 1 the greatest.  The risk 
rating is intended to reflect the likelihood of an actual or potential financial breach of the foundation 
WUXVW¶V WHUPV RI DXWKRULVDWLRQ EDVHG RQ IRXU FULWHULD DFKLHYHPHQW RI SODQ XQGHUO\LQJ SHUIRUPDQFH
financial efficiency, and liquidity. 
 
These data are available on the regulators website from 2005 onwards in the form of 17 quarterly 
reports (Monitor 2005 ± 2009d). Over this period 75% of risk ratings were at risk level 4 or 5 (the 
lowest risk ratings) though it should be noted that this data does not include the period in which 
Bradford Teaching Hospitals became engulfed in a financial crisis which eventually led to the removal 
of its chairman in December 2004. 
 
We have constructed Figure 1 to show the FRR over time for the first 32 trusts which provided 
complete information over the period Monitor has published the quarterly risk ratings.  The focus on 
the first FTs allows comparison of the performance of the same group of established FTs over time. 
 
Figure 1 
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There are two noticeable trends in the data series. The first is a general improvement over time up to 
the period 12/2007 and 3/2008 as more and more FTs receive a risk rating in the 2 lower risk bands.  
7KH VHFRQG WUHQG LV DQ LQFUHDVH LQ µ¶ UDWLQJV DQG UHGXFWLRQ RI µ¶ UDWLQJV IURP  RQZDUGV
Although not shown here, a second tranche of the following 27 FTs show a similar initial pattern of 
LPSURYHPHQWIROORZHGE\DQLQFUHDVHLQµ¶UDWLQJVDQGUHGXFWLRQRIµ¶VIURPRQZDUGV 
 
The replication of the pattern across the different tranches and in particular the consistency of the 
increase in higher risk ratings from early to mid 2008 suggests that the financial climate may be at 
least partly responsible.  Nevertheless, the financial autonomy given to FTs means that they 
themselves should be considering and adapting to the risk of potential financial shocks: the increase 
in higher FRRs indicates that this may not be the case. The Times reported that Mr Moyes said he 
had requested that foundation trust chief executives resubmit a µdownside assessment¶ ² stripping 
back their budgets ² to get a more realistic grasp of the funding pressures they faced, but was 
disappointed when, on being asked to revise their financial predictions in September, a number of 
trusts had resubmitted even more rosetinted forecasts of growth. (Lister 2010) 
 
Thus although the evidence to date clearly shows that FTs are producing the expected surpluses, the 
(delayed) impact of the current financial climate may present a real threat to the ability of FTs to 
continue to produce such surpluses. 
 
A second possible source of finance available to FTs is that provided by access to credit markets.  In 
this respect however, FTs do not seem to be behaving as expected ± ³Monitor ... has found that FTs 
are not taking full advantage of their borrowing freedoms and have accessed only £100 million out of 
£2.5 billion available´, (Audit Commission 2008).   
 
The lack of borrowing may partly be a function of a lack of available credit, with commentators arguing 
that as hospital tariffs are in a constant state of flux this means that future income for FTs is uncertain 
(House of Commons Health Committee Report 2008) and that a lack of an insolvency regime means 
that private banks would be reluctant to lend (Mooney 2006).  
 
But arguably the biggest factor is that FTs have not felt the need to borrow: it appears to be an issue 
of the demand for credit, rather than the supply of credit. 
 
As the chairman of the regulator suggested: ³Trusts are not clear where investment is needed.  The 
second reason is that a lot of them are now planning investment in a piecemeal fashion; they are not 
looking to re-build the whole hospital but hospitals like Bradford ... are publishing ten year investment 
plans that can be done in chunks and they can largely raise the finance to do that from their own 
resources, from surpluses they are generating´. (House of Commons Health Committee Report 2008) 
 
Though there is no obvious cause for the lack of demand for credit (DoH 2009) there are two 
plausible suggestions. Firstly there is a lack of direction from PCTs, specifically what types of 
investments they would like to see the FTs engage in.  Under such circumstances it is risky for FTs to 
engage in large scale investments that PCTs may not ultimately want.  Secondly given the limited 
nature of the investment plans, it has not only been possible to fund these through accumulated 
surpluses, but an accumulation of surpluses has occurred that has no obvious immediate purpose. 
 
The accumulation of unused surplus has itself been raised as an issue by the House of Commons 
Health Committee Report (2008) as there is the expectation that FTs would not retain large unused 
surpluses over time. However several FTs have reported stockpiling surplus to act as a buffer to the 
anticipated decrease in health funding and uncertainty surrounding the national tariff.   Furthermore, it 
has not been an issue that has been highlighted at PCT level; ³We tend as a PCT not to think about 
the surpluses; we tend to argue about our bottom line and coming in on budget´ (John Carrier of 
Camden PCT).  The future financial climate may change this perspective. 
 
That is not to say there has been no capital investment or impact on services. For example the 
Christie Hospital has built radiotherapy centres across Greater Manchester and Cheshire (the first 
network of its kind in the UK) and Sheffield Teaching Hospitals are funding a £30 million critical care 
unit. E[DPSOHVRIRWKHULQQRYDWLRQVLQVHUYLFHVVXFKDV³VHOISD\´GHUPDWRORJ\VHUYLFHVDOVRH[LVW+&
and Audit Commission 2008). There are examples where it is claimed that FT status has enabled 
more speedy resolution of innovative deals, such as a FT and charity partnership to deliver mobile 
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chemotherapy services and a partnership with a private company to deliver IVF services for NHS and 
private patients (House of Commons Health Committee Report 2008).  However, it is not 
straightforward to attribute such developments to FT status per se (as commissioners are being 
encouraged to develop and innovate in partnership with all providers, not just FTs) so there is little 
firm evidence about innovation of FTs, a point noted by the Health Committee in recommending that 
the government initiate evaluation of the extent of innovation by FTs (House of Commons Health 
Committee Report 2008). 
 
3.3 Conclusions 
 
FTs have been successful in generating and accumulating financial surpluses, a process which 
appears to have been aided because FT status creates an incentive for improved financial practices. 
 
However, this position may change as a consequence of the current financial climate.  Analysis of 
0RQLWRU¶VUHSRUWVVXJJHVWVWKDWDIWHUDVXVWDLQHGGHFUHDVHLQILQDQFLDOULVNUDWLQJVWKHUHKDVEHHQDQ
increase from mid 2008 and that current 3 year plans submitted by FTs are unduly optimistic. 
 
FTs are not using credit facilities to the anticipated extent.  This is primarily due to a lack of larger-
scale investment plans and thus smaller scale investment has been mostly funded from existing 
surpluses.   
 
This has led to stockpiled and unused surplus held by FTs - a situation which may have arisen partly 
as a result of a lack of direction from PCTs in terms of what investments they would like to see and 
also a general lack of concern about what FTs are doing with their surpluses.  The changing financial 
climate may affect this lack of concern. 
 
 
4. Quality 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Quality is a broad encompassing term covering many aspects of service provision including waiting 
times, convenience, etc. as well as conventional measures of clinical outcomes such as mortality 
rates and infection rates.  
 
4.2 Evidence 
 
It is arguable that quality has not received the same emphasis as financial matters in the build up to 
FT status.  The Darzi report has helped focus attention on this factor, but the evidence on FTs and the 
quality of services is rather thin.  As with finance ³FTs are generally high performers in routine NHS 
process quality measures´ though this finding again may be contaminated by the non-random 
selection of high-performing trusts to FT status (House of Commons Health Committee Report 2008). 
 
However, as with finance, Monitor also produces quarterly Governance Risk Ratings (GRR) which 
attempt to capture these quality dimensions in a single measure on a 3 point scale (µUed¶ ± concerns 
that issue or issues significantly breach Terms of Authorisation; µDmber¶ ± concerns about one or 
more aspects of governance; and µJreen¶ ± governance complies with terms of authorisation).   We 
examine how the performance of the original 32 FTs is progressing and present our results below. 
The reporting of only 31 observations in 09/2006 is due to Moorfields Eye Hospital not receiving a 
GRR.   
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Figure 2 
Figure 2 shows an increase in green rated FTs over time with either a blip or reverse in trend at 
09/2009.  As with the FRR this pattern is replicated with the next tranche of FTs (not shown).    
Although over time the average risk rating has fallen, there has been a persistence of 2 to 3 red-rated 
trusts which was largely absent over the first half of the time-series.  Further examination reveals that 
it tends to be the same trusts that have these ratings, sometimes for a whole financial year.  This 
IHDWXUH ZDV QRWHG LQ WKH +R&+&  UHSRUW DQG GUHZ D UHVSRQVH WKDW 0RQLWRU ZRXOG µLQVWLJDWH
SURFHHGLQJV¶LIDWUXVt remained with a red rating for more than two consecutive periods. 
 
One such example is the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust which, since its inception as an FT, 
has produced four consecutive amber ratings followed by three consecutive red ratings (March 2008 
WR6HSWHPEHU$OWKRXJKWKLVKDVXQGHUVWDQGDEO\SURGXFHGEDGKHDGOLQHVDVDIDLOLQJµIODJVKLS¶
hospital, it is clear that these failings were present in 2007 - prior to the trust obtaining FT status 
(Alberti 2009). More recent examples include failings at Colchester Hospital University NHS 
Foundation Trust and nearby Basildon and Thurrock NHS Trust whose failings appear to have 
occurred after FT status was achieved.  
 
4.3 Conclusions 
 
FTs generally score more highly in quality dimensions than non-FTs, though given the lack of 
emphasis on quality and tailored incentives, this may be more a function of the self-selection of the 
best-performing trusts to FT status rather than a function of FT status itself.  The Darzi report has 
placed greater emphasis on quality outcomes and this position may change in the future if quality-
adjusted tariffs are implemented. 
 
There have been a number of high-profile quality failures, with some very recent failures occurring 
some time after FT status has been achieved.  And although the average quality rating has improved 
RYHUWLPHWKHUHKDYHEHHQDQXPEHURIWUXVWVZKLFKV\VWHPDWLFDOO\UHSRUWµ5HG¶ULVNUDWLQJVRYHUWLPH 
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5. Regulation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The independent regulatory body called Monitor was introduced in 2004 to regulate FTs (Health and 
Social Care Act 2003).  Monitor is responsible for authorising new FTs by ensuring they meet the 
required standards for licensing.  It sets the financial and audit regime and also monitors FT 
performance (Monitor 2007e).  MonitRU¶VUHJXODWRU\VW\OHUHIOHFWVWKHJUHDWHUDXWRQRP\JUDQWHGWR)7V
by adoption of a proportionate risk approach in which well-managed and successful FTs are 
requested to provide minimal information to Monitor.  It has a range of formal intervention powers to 
tackle problems that fail to be addressed through the normal assessment processes.  
 
FTs are responsible to Monitor rather than to the Secretary of State but Monitor works alongside the 
recently formed Care Quality Commission (previously it worked mainly with the Healthcare 
Commission) to assess the performance of FTs against national targets and quality standards and 
states that it seeks to share information and intelligence with other regulators and to avoid duplication 
(Monitor 2009e). 
 
5.2 Evidence 
 
The aim of proportionate regulation means that formal intervention is a last resort for Monitor but in 
2008-09 a number of cases required such action (Mid-Staffs and the Royal National Hospital for 
Rheumatic Diseases), ranging from requiring a review by the board, to replacement of senior posts 
including the chair and chief executive.  A further 8 FTs were found to be in µsignificant breach¶ of their 
authorisation and closer monitoring and reporting arrangements were set in place.  The Monitor 
website lists 7 trusts that were subjected to formal interventions since 2005, with 4 of them occurring 
in October 2009 or later (Monitor 2010). These interventions are listed in the appendix.  
 
One area that has received attention recently is the effectiveness of the assessment and regulatory 
regime operated by Monitor given the significant and high-profile failings related to quality of care, 
governance and leadership at Mid-Staffordshire FT just one month after it acquired FT status.  The 
Healthcare Commission identified serious failings in the quality of emergency care at the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS FT and reported that the focus of the Board was on financial savings and securing 
FT status and that it lost sight of its responsibilities to deliver acceptable standards of health care 
(Healthcare Commission 2009). Whilst Monitor flagged up that it had previously taken some steps to 
address concerns, some commentators argue that Monitor was slow to spot these and that the 
intervention of the Healthcare Commission was required before more radical action was taken. 
 
It is therefore informative to examine the risk ratings of trusts before intervention was required.  In the 
case of Bradford and Mid-Staffordshire, their problems pre-dated either FT status or the current risk-
rating procedure.  However for the Royal National Hospital for Rheumatic Diseases, prior to the 
IRUPDOLQWHUYHQWLRQWKH\KDGUHFRUGHGIRXUµJUHHQ¶DQGRQHµDPEHU¶UDWLQJLQWKHSUHYLRXVILYHTXDUWHUV
IRU *55 DQG PRVWO\ µ¶V IRU )55  )RU +HDWKHUZRRG DQG :H[KDP 3Drk there was half a year of 
µJUHHQ¶VDQG WKH ORZHVW)55SULRU WRDVXGGHQGHWHULRUDWLRQUHSRUWHG LQ0DUFK WRD µUHG¶*55
DQGKLJK)550RQLWRULQWHUYHQHG-XO\$QG%DVLOGRQDFKLHYHDµJUHHQ¶UDWLQJHLJKWRXWRIWKH
previous nine periods prior tRDµUHG¶WULJJHULQJ0RQLWRUDFWLRQ 
 
Dorset and Colchester show less sudden paths to intervention.  For Dorset a record of seven 
FRQVHFXWLYHµJUHHQ¶*55VOHDGVWRWZRµDPEHUV¶DQGWKHQDµUHG¶LQWKHILQDOSHULRG7KLVLVPDWFKHG
by a similar decline LQ)55)RU&ROFKHVWHUWKHUHDUHDJDLQWZRµDPEHU¶UDWLQJVSUHFHGLQJWKHµUHG¶ 
 
Thus although there is no dominating pattern, the slight majority of trusts requiring intervention lurch 
into that position with little or no warning provided by the risk-rating structures.  This may be because 
problems do develop very quickly or alternatively that the ratings (especially quality ratings) are not 
particularly useful as a signal of developing problems.  There does appear to be some evidence that 
supports the latter conclusion as the risk-rating measures are based on self-assessments and self-
certification.  A recent Audit Commission report is critical, finding that there existed ³significant gaps 
between the processes on paper and the rigour with which they are applied´ and that ³overall there 
was room for much improvement.  In the worst cases, the assurance process had become a paper 
FKDVH UDWKHU WKDQDFULWLFDO H[DPLQDWLRQRI WKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI WKH WUXVW¶V LQWHUQDO FRQWUROV DQG ULVN
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management arrangements.  The NHS has, in many cases, been run on trust´.  The report noted that 
Mid-Staffordshire had certified that it was compliant with all core standards except that relating to 
waste disposal when subsequent examination revealed it had major failings in quality provision (Audit 
Commission 2009). This issue relates to the broader issue of the effectiveness of the performance 
assessment regime for all trusts, not just for FTs. 
 
Relying on a more objective measure of outcomes, the Dr Foster health information guide lists 14 FTs 
as currently having significantly higher than average Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratios (HSMRs).  
Of these, four have had high rates for the past five years these being: Basildon, Royal Bolton, 
Tameside and Kettering General.  Inspection of the GRR over the time periods for which they have 
SURYLGHG ULVN UDWLQJV SURYLGHV RQO\ RQH µUHG¶ WKH PRVW UHFHQW %DVLOGRQ *55 ILIWHHQ µDPEHUV¶ DQG
ILIWHHQµJUHHQV¶ 
 
Monitor has since reported that it has formalised the contact it has with the Care Quality Commission 
prior to authorisation of FTs and undertakes a more systematic review of clinical performance data 
from FT applicants.   Monitor has also formalised the processes used to escalate regulatory issues 
when there are concerns about any aspHFWRI)7¶VFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHWHUPVRI WKHLUDXWKRULVDWLRQ
They suggest that their actions in relation to identifying those FTs at risk of not achieving nationally 
set targets for reductions in MRSA cases is an indication that their approach is working (Monitor 
2010).  In addition, there has been a focus on the role of the Board in leading on matters of clinical 
quality. 
 
However, in the follow-up to the Mid-Staffs case, concern has been expressed that one element of 
failure related to the overlapping responsibilities and roles of different parties,  including the trust, 
PCT, StHAs and regulators and that some issues and responsibilities appear to fall between 
organisations (Thome 2009).  In addition, it was noted that FTs at times make themselves µsomewhat 
inaccessible¶ to their commissioners. This was not seen as acceptable when the FTs are part of the 
NHS and must be accountable to commissioners for the quality of care. 
 
Whilst there has been an emphasis by Monitor on their role in co-operating and sharing information 
with µappropriate¶ partners (Monitor 2010), there have been signals of some tension between the 
boundaries of the regulators.  In 2008, the NHS Chief Executive included FTs in his circular 
instructing all trusts on detailed matters of infection control following an outbreak at one hospital.  The 
media reported that the Chief Executive of Monitor was not pleased with the instructive tone of the 
letter and queried whether in was in contravention of legislation because it implied a direct line 
management accountability between FTs and the Department of Health (HSJ 2008).  The Chief 
Executive of Monitor subsequently suggested that issuing guidance to commissioners, rather than 
direct to providers, is a more appropriate route by which the Department of Health can express 
concerns about detailed aspects of service provision (Health Care Commission 2005) 
 
Similar issues arose after the Darzi report indicated that a proposed new regulatory agency would be 
responsible for registration and de-registration of FTs, a proposal to which Monitor objected.  Issues 
concerning lines of accountability arose in response to government proposals in the Health Bill which 
required quality accounts to be sent to the Health Secretary, which Monitor perceived as a potential 
threat to the independence of FTs.  The FT Network has highlighted the perceived conflict between 
central controls and targets and the independence of FTs and argues for local targets to be set by 
FTs with their partners (FTN 2005).   
 
0RQLWRU¶VDSSURach to regulation that stresses the autonomy of FTs has also raised questions about 
the reporting responsibilities and the accountability of FTs.  In addition to concerns expressed by the 
review of the Mid-Staffs case, and about the transparency and availability of comparative financial 
information for evaluation purposes (House of Commons Health Committee 2008), there are reports 
of a lack of transparency in other areas also.  Woodward et al (2009) looked at the online availability 
and accessibility of the PLQXWHVRI UHFHQWGLUHFWRU¶VERDUGPHHWLQJVFRPSDULQJ UDQGRPVDPSOHVRI
FTs, non FTs and PCTs. A higher proportion of minutes were not available in FTs (37.5%) than in 
non-)7V6RPH)7VVWDWHGWKDWGLUHFWRU¶VERDUGPHHWLQJVDUHRUZRXOGEHKHOG in private but 
governors board meetings were public and minutes available.   The option for holding private board of 
directors meetings is available only to FTs and Woodward notes that Mid-Staffs held private meetings 
and did not publish minutes.  The Healthcare Commission also noted that the board did not routinely 
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discuss issues of quality of care and Woodward comments that greater public scrutiny may have 
influenced the way in which boards conduct and report on trust business.   
 
Anecdotally there appears to be concern with perceived secretiveness of FTs in relation to other types 
of data, for example, on pay levels (reported by the RCN, (Taylor, 2007)). Actions such as these 
appear at odds with the original intention that FTs would have stronger connections to their local 
stakeholders and suggest that there might be an imbalance between autonomy and accountability. 
Similar issues of accountability arise in the relationship between PCTs and FTs and early research on 
µearned autonomy¶ (the pre-cursor policy to the introduction of FTs) highlighted some potential 
concerns that trusts viewed enhanced autonomy, and ultimately FT status, as a means to shift the 
balance of power away from commissioners towards providers (Goddard and Mannion 2006).  
Subsequently, commentators have noted that PCTs perhaps should have been strengthened and 
given more power or autonomy before the provider side was strengthened through FT status 
(reported in Mooney 2009).  The introduction of PbR potentially strains relationships further because 
in the absence of demand control, there is little PCTS can do to prevent over-trading on the part of 
FTs and the creation of subsequent financial difficulties for the PCT.  
 
Having identified issues within FTs the next question is whether Monitor¶V intervention is effective.  
(YLGHQFH IRU WKLV LVSURYLGHGE\0RQLWRU¶VVHOI-commissioned evaluation report regarding its impact.  
With respect to the four case studies regarding concerns over the financial positions of trusts 
(Bradford, Homerton University, Royal Devon and Exeter and UCLH) they estimated that they caused 
a reduction in deficit of £16 million and faster recovery savings of £20-£25 million for Bradford and 
Royal Devon.  In terms of governance, there was no analysis of an intervention effect. (Frontier 
Economics, Monitor 2009).  
 
The relationship between Monitor and the CQC and also other regulators, will need attention 
especially as more trusts become FTs.  In addition to ensuring clarity about roles in order to ensure 
there are no gaps, there may also be efficiencies in combining some or all regulatory functions. 
0RQLWRU¶VRSHUDWLQJFRVWVZHUHP LQ0RQLWRU7KHSRVLWLRQRI WKH&4& LVPRUH
difficult to assess given it was in a transition phase and responsible for overseeing the merger of 
regulatory bodies into the new organisation.  They report an operating budget of £166.8m for 2009/10 
(CQC 2009).  The NHS Co-operation and Competition Panel has also recently entered the regulatory 
arena.   
 
5.3 Conclusions 
 
A major issue is the clarity and cost-effectiveness of the regulatory regime. On one hand there is a 
need to avoid duplication and excessive demands on providers and attempts to control everything 
from the centre; and on the other the need to ensure there are clear roles and responsibilities for 
regulators and other organisations such as StHAs and PCTS, without gaps arising, and that 
accountability for the use of public money is ensured. 
 
The regulatory landscape will need to be clarified when all trusts become FTs as supporting separate 
regulators may be expensive and produce a lack of coherence. There is some evidence to suggest 
the lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities has played a part in the failure to address serious 
performance issues in a timely fashion. 
 
 
6. Research and policy issues 
 
Overall there is limited research evidence on foundation trusts and much of the available material is in 
the form of commentary or the regular reports from Monitor.  Comparative research is made difficult 
through lack of a counter-factual and robust methods are required to overcome bias.  The majority of 
evidence originates from qualitative research on the nature and impact of the FT governance 
arrangements in relation to the role of governors and the impact of public membership.   
 
Measuring the impact of the FT governance arrangements is difficult to do other than in a qualitative 
way.  Current research of which we are aware includes an SDO funded study on the governance of 
FTs based around four case studies (Allen et al; due to report end 2010) investigating the internal and 
external governance arrangements for FTs and comparing the effectiveness of arrangements with 
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those of non-FTs.  Gathering evidence on the estimated costs of the FT governance arrangements 
would be a useful addition to the literature on effectiveness and impact and would inform judgements 
about the degree to which FTs should retain (and replicate) these as the policy rolls out to all trusts.  
 
An updated and extended version of the quantitative analysis of FT performance undertaken 
previously at the Centre for Health Economics, University of York (Marini et al, 2008) is underway and 
will report later in 2010.  This research employs robust methods in order to account as far as possible 
for selection bias and will provide evidence on the more recent performance of FTs than was possible 
in the original work.  Further extensions of this work to include more variables of interest and more 
years of data would be useful, although accessing relevant data is not always straightforward as FTs 
do not have to report data to the centre in the same way as other trusts and there is not always a 
willingness on the part of Monitor or the FTs to provide the information for research. 
 
Given the challenges of comparative analysis of FTs and non-FTs, there is also merit in exploring the 
performance of FTs over time.  The illustrative analysis of finance and performance presented in this 
review is a starting point for a more sophisticated analysis that separates out the underlying difference 
between trusts as they become FTs and their performance over time. 
 
Identification of the extent to which the FT regime has enabled innovative service development that 
would not have otherwise taken place, seems worthwhile although challenging in terms of 
establishing the counter-factual.  However, drawing together evidence and examples from across the 
StHAs in a comprehensive way may be a good starting point.   
 
There are a number of policy and research issues around the future regulatory regime in the NHS. 
Following the consolidation of some regulatory functions into the CQC and as more trusts become 
FTs, there is scope to consider the cost-effectiveness of the separation of regulators.  This could 
potentially be informed by experience in other sectors and in the healthcare sector, internationally. 
 
The effectiveness of the current regulatory regime as a means of signalling potential quality failings in 
a timely way is an issue that goes beyond the FT regime but is of great importance in the broader 
NHS. 
 
 
7. Appendix A  
 
7.1 Formal Monitor interventions 
 
Bradford Teaching Hospitals (2004): Two actions in late 2004 the first of which was to require the 
appointment of external advisers, and shortly after, the appointment of a new chair. The steady 
improvement in its financial performance meant the trust returned to quarterly monitoring in 2006, in 
line with the majority of NHS foundation trusts. 
 
Royal National Hospital for Rheumatic Diseases (2008): In April 2008 the trust identified a 
significant control wHDNQHVV LQ WKH WUXVW¶VDFFRXQWV OHDGLQJ WRDFKDQJHG ILQDQFLDO ULVNUDWLQJRI LQ
quarter 4 of 2007-08. On 4 August 2008 Monitor used its formal powers to intervene with an aim to 
ensuring that appropriate regulatory control was in place to assist in the maintenance and protection 
RIWUXVWVHUYLFHVIRUSDWLHQWV,Q'HFHPEHU0RQLWRU¶V%RDUGGHFLGHGWRLQWHUYHQHIRUDVHFRQG
WLPH LQ RUGHU WR VHFXUH WKH UHVRXUFHV DQG VNLOOV UHTXLUHG WR GHOLYHU WKH WUXVW %RDUG¶V VWUDWHJ\ DQG
longer term financial stability and in April 2009, Monitor's Board intervened for a third time to appoint 
an Interim CEO and Interim Chair. 
 
Mid Staffordshire (2009): In March 2009 Monitor used its formal powers to replace and appoint an 
interim Chief Executive replaced by a permanent appointment in July/August 2009. Monitor continues 
to hold Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust to account at each step towards delivery of its 
Transformation Plan. 
 
Heatherwood and Wexham Park Hospitals (2009): In July 2009, Monitor found the trust to have 
suffered a rapid decline in financial and operational performance.  As a result the trust was required to 
VXEPLWD UHFRYHU\SODQSUHVHQWHG WR0RQLWRU LQ2FWREHU0RQLWRU¶V%RDUGGLGQRWFRQVLGHU WKDW WKLV
SODQZDVUREXVWHQRXJKWRHQVXUHWKHWUXVW¶s return to a sustainable position, or that it demonstrated 
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that the trust had in place the board and clinical leadership necessary to achieve this.  In October 
2009, Monitor intervened again appointing an interim chair. 
 
Dorset County Hospital (2009): In October 2009, Monitor found the trust to be in significant breach 
of its terms of authorisation due to a failure to comply with its general duty to exercise its functions 
effectively, efficiently and economically. Monitor used its formal powers of intervention to appoint - 
with immediate effect - an Interim Chair at the trust.  
 
Basildon and Thurrock University Hospital (2009): In November 2009 Monitor found the trust to be 
in significant breach of its terms of authorisation due to concerns around leadership and quality of 
care at the trust. Monitor is requiring the trust board to use an expert taskforce to manage and report 
on the delivery of plans to improve quality of service; agree with Monitor the objective performance 
metrics against which the tUXVW¶V performance will be measured and reviewed monthly; and take 
immediate steps to strengthen senior clinical capacity, in particular, to provide additional support to 
the Medical Director and Director of Nursing. 
 
Colchester Hospital University (2009): In November 2009 Monitor found the trust to be in significant 
breach of its terms of authorisation due to the tUXVW¶V IDLOXUHWRFRPSO\ZLWKKHDOWKFDUHVWDQGDUGVLWV
failure to exercise its functions effectively, efficiently and economically; and serious and wide ranging 
concerns as to overall governance and leadership at the trust. Monitor used its regulatory powers to 
remove the Chair of the trust with immediate effect and appoint an interim Chair.  
 
Although not listed as a formal intervention, Monitor did appoint a turn-around team for University 
College London Hospitals (2005) with the aim of recovering patient activity lost during transfer to new 
hospital premises and the financial overspend this caused in August 2005  As a result the annual 
overspend trend was reversed and a surplus position achieved in 2007/08. 
 
As four of the FTs that have only recently required intervention it is difficult to judge whether such 
intervention has been successful. However looking at the earlier interventions, Whilst Bradford 
DSSHDUVWRKDYHPDGHDIXOOUHFRYHU\51+5'KDVUHFRUGHGLWVVL[WKVXFFHVVLYHµUHG¶UDWLQJIRU*55
and seventh successive 1 or 2 high risk rating in FRR. 
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